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Canadian and American securities market regulators have 
differing approaches to enforcement. In this article, we present the 
results of an empirical study comparing a highly salient aspect of 
securities enforcement—insider trading—in Canada and the 
United States. We reach a number of important findings. First, 
adjusting for trading volume, Canada has a greater intensity of 
enforcement when compared to the U.S. Second, Canadian 
securities regulators primarily concern themselves with insider 
trading in Canadian companies, while the SEC brings more 
enforcement actions involving insider trading in companies 
incorporated outside the U.S. Third, we do not find significant 
differences in the fraction of actions involving multiple traded 
companies between Canada and the U.S. However, we do see that 
U.S. investigations involve a significantly greater number of 
defendants and that the SEC is more than twice as likely to pursue 
tippers or tippees (although we observe no significant difference 
in the likelihood that top insiders will be pursued). Fourth, we find 
that U.S. cases are significantly more likely to result in a criminal 
referral leading to prosecution. Fifth, we find that settlements are 
more likely in the U.S. Finally, in terms of monetary penalties, we 
find no significant difference between the two countries. However, 
we do find that Canada is more likely to apply a bar as a sanction, 
but if a bar is applied, the U.S. is more likely to make the bar 
permanent. These findings neither demonstrate a need for 
systemic reform in either jurisdiction nor suggest that centralized 
regulation is necessarily better from an enforcement perspective. 
But, they do provide insight into the differing points of regulatory 
emphasis in two jurisdictions. From a comparative perspective, 
our research thus allows securities regulators to begin to evaluate 












The securities markets of Canada and the United States 
are closely integrated. A significant number of public companies 
are listed on stock exchanges in both countries, encouraged by 
coordinated disclosure and offering requirements that facilitate 
capital raising on both sides of the border. One aspect of 
securities regulation, however, remains largely distinct: 
enforcement. Although provincial securities regulators in 
Canada have entered into memoranda of understanding with the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to facilitate 
investigations involving conduct in both countries, the 
enforcement regimes remain separate.1 Moreover, the two 
countries have different regulatory structures, with provincial 
and territorial securities commissions playing the principal role 
in Canada, whereas the SEC overshadows state securities 
regulators in the U.S. These differences in regulatory structure 
invite a comparison of the two approaches. Moreover, there is a 
long-standing and lively debate in Canada over whether to move 
to a national or “cooperative” regulator, modeled to some extent 
on the SEC. This debate, however, suffers from a dearth of 
empirical evidence comparing the two alternative regulatory 
models.2 
In this article, we present the results of an empirical study 
comparing a highly salient aspect of securities enforcement—
insider trading—in Canada and the U.S. The SEC has greater 
resources, greater economies of scale, and more experience in 
bringing insider trading actions. These factors suggest that the 
SEC will have the capacity to bring more insider trading actions 
than its Canadian counterparts. In order to test this and related 
hypotheses, we identified insider trading enforcement actions 
brought by provincial securities regulators in Canada and the 
SEC in the U.S. from 2005 to 2015. For these actions, we 
collected data on industry, number and type of defendants, time 
to resolution, and sanctions imposed. Our data are cross-
sectional in nature and thus, our findings are largely based on 
correlations. Nonetheless, we believe that our findings mark a 
                                                            
1 Enforcement within Canada can differ among Canadian provinces and 
territories. We take this point into account in our empirical analysis. 
2 See generally, for a comparison of public and private enforcement in 
Canada and the U.S., Poonam Puri, “Securities Litigation and Enforcement” 
(2012) 37:3 Brook J Int L 967. 
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first step in assessing differences and similarities in Canadian 
and U.S. insider trading enforcement. 
We find, unsurprisingly, that the number of actions is 
much larger in the U.S., reflecting its larger economy and the size 
of its capital markets. But when we examine the numbers relative 
to the amount of trading, the intensity of enforcement in Canada 
looks considerably greater, inconsistent with our hypothesis that 
the SEC will bring its greater resources to bear in pursuing 
insider trading cases. However, Canadian securities regulators 
primarily concern themselves with insider trading in Canadian 
companies, while the SEC brings more enforcement actions 
involving insider trading against foreign incorporated companies 
listed in the U.S. 
This article contributes to the developing body of 
empirical scholarship studying enforcement actions in securities 
regulation. Much of the existing literature focuses solely on the 
U.S., including studies on: the interaction between public and 
private enforcement;3 the role of scandals and other forms of 
public pressure on enforcement decisions at the SEC;4 the SEC’s 
choice between enforcement in civil court or before an SEC 
administrative law judge;5 the incentives of SEC enforcement 
attorneys;6 the accuracy of enforcement statistics put forth by the 
SEC;7 the role of lead plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys in 
shareholder litigation;8 the characteristics of securities class 
                                                            
3 See Stephen J Choi & A C Pritchard, “SEC Investigations and Securities 
Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison” (2016) 13:1 J Empirical Leg Stud 
27.  
4 See Stephen J Choi, A C Pritchard & Anat Carmy Wiechman, “Scandal 
Enforcement at the SEC: The Arc of the Option Backdating Investigations”  
(2013) 15:2 Am L & Econ Rev 542. 
5 See Stephen J Choi & A C Pritchard, “The SEC’s Shift to Administrative 
Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment” (2017) 34:1 Yale J Reg 1. 
6 See Ed deHaan, Simi Kedia, Kevin Koh, & Shivaram Rajgopal, “The 
Revolving Door and the SEC’s Enforcement Outcomes: Initial Evidence from 
Civil Litigation” (2015) 60: 2-3 J Acc & Econ 65. 
7 See Urska Velikonja, “Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s 
Enforcement Statistics” (2016) 101:4 Cornell Law Review 901. 
8 See Stephen J Choi, Jessica Erickson & Adam Pritchard, “Frequent Filers: 
Repeat Plaintiffs in Shareholder Litigation (U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal 
Reform September 2013); Stephen J Choi, Drew Skinner & A C Pritchard, 
“The Price of Pay for Play in Securities Class Actions” (2011) 8:4 J Empirical 
Leg Stud 650; Stephen J Choi, “Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class 
Actions” (2011) 40:1 Journal of Legal Studies 205; Stephen J Choi & Robert 
Thompson, “Securities Litigation and its Lawyers: Changes During the First 
Decade After the PSLRA” (2006) 106:7 Colum L Rev 1489. 
5 
 
actions against bankrupt companies;9 the role of auditors in 
settlements and securities class actions;10 and the presence of 
frivolous lawsuits and the impact of reforms to combat such 
lawsuits.11 Missing from this literature, however, is a comparative 
analysis of enforcement across borders. This study offers a 
unique contribution in this regard, providing original data from 
the SEC and provincial securities commissions in Canada.  
We proceed as follows. Part 2 provides background on the 
regulatory regimes in Canada and the U.S., with specific 
reference to insider trading. Part 3 develops our hypotheses. Part 
4 presents the results of our empirical tests. Part 5 offers analysis 
of the results and concluding thoughts on the policy implications 




Canada does not have a national securities regulator; in 
the U.S., by contrast, the principal securities laws are federally 
enacted and enforced by the SEC.12 Securities laws, including 
insider trading laws, are enacted and enforced at the provincial 
and territorial levels. However, insider trading law is generally 
consistent across Canadian provincial and territorial 
jurisdictions. The modern justification for insider trading laws in 
Canada comes from the 1965 Kimber Report, which asserted that 
all investors (insiders and outsiders alike) should be able to 
                                                            
9 See James J Park, “Securities Class Actions and Bankrupt Companies” 
(2013) 111:4 Mich L Rev 547. 
10 See James J Park, “Auditor Settlements of Securities Class Actions” (2017) 
14:1 J Empirical Leg Stud 169.  
11 Stephen J Choi & A C Pritchard, “The Supreme Court's Impact on 
Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs” (2012) 28:4 J 
L, Econ, & Org 850; Stephen J Choi, Karen Nelson & A C Pritchard, “The 
Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act” (2009) 6:1 J 
Empirical Leg Stud 35; Stephen J Choi, “Do the Merits Matter Less After the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act” (2007) 23:3 J L Econ & Org 598; 
Marilyn F Johnson, Karen K Nelson & A C Pritchard, “Do the Merits Matter 
More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act” (2007) 
23:3 J L, Econ & Org 652; Stephen J Choi, Jill E Fisch & A C Pritchard, “Do 
Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, (2005) 83:4 Wash ULQ 869; Stephen J 
Choi & James Bohn, “Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence 
on Securities Class Actions” (1996) 144:3 U Penn L Rev 903. 
12 Reference Re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837.  
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participate in the capital markets on a level playing field and 
therefore insider trading should be prohibited.13 Following the 
Kimber Report, the Ontario Securities Act of 1966 introduced the 
first substantial regulation of insider trading in Canada.14 
 
Unlike the U.S., the basic rules on insider trading in 
Canada are set forth in statute.15 Insiders are defined as directors 
or officers of the reporting issuer or subsidiaries of the reporting 
issuer.16 In addition, any person or company that has a direct or 
indirect beneficial ownership of, or control or direction over, 
more than 10 per cent of the reporting issuer’s voting securities, 
is also an insider.17 Provincial securities commissions also have 
broad discretion to designate a person or company as an insider, 
if doing so would be in the public interest.18 Insiders may 
purchase or sell securities, provided that their trades are not 
based on undisclosed (non-public) material information and are 
reported within five days from the date of the trade (National 
Instrument 55-104). Insider reports are typically filed online 
through the “System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders” 
                                                            
13 The Kimber, chaired by John R Kimber, Q.C., Report of the Attorney 
General’s Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario (Toronto: Queen’s 
Printer, 1965) at 10. Case law continues to evidence a commitment to this 
concern. For example, in In the Matter of M.C.J.C Holdings Inc. and 
Michael Cowpland [2002] 25 OSCB 1133, an OSC panel used its public 
interest jurisdiction to reject a settlement with an insider trader because 
there was no assurance that the conduct would not occur again and a 
concern that the settlement agreement would not sufficiently deter others 
from committing insider trading. The lack of deterrence was particularly 
important to the panel, as it felt that “illegal insider trading by its very nature 
is a cancer that erodes public confidence in the capital markets” and 
therefore must be sufficiently punished. 
14 David Johnston, Kathleen Rockwell & Cristie Ford, Canadian Securities 
Regulation (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at 339. 
15 See for example Securities Act (Ontario), RSO ss 107, 76 (1990) [OSA]. 
16 Directors and officers are defined in such a way so as to include people 
who lack the formal title but act in the capacity of a director or officer. See 
for example: Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s.1(o), Securities Act, RSBC 
1996, c 418, s 1(1); Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S.5, s 1(1).  
17 Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s 1(aa); Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418, s 
1(1)(“insider); Securities Act, CCSM c S50, s 1(1) (“insider”); Securities Act, 
SNB 2004, c S-5.5, s 1(1) (“insider”); Securities Act, RSNL 1990, c S-13, s 
2(1)(s); Securities Act, RSNS 1989, c 418, s 2(1)(r); Securities Act, RSO 1990, 
c S 5, s 1(1)(“insider”); Securities Act, RSPEI 1988, c S-3.1, s 1(z); Securities 
Act, RSQ, c v-1.1, s 89. 
18 Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, ss 1 (aa) “Insider” (v), 10(1)(c); Securities 
Act, RSBC 1996, c 418, ss 1(1) “insider” (e), 3.2(a); Securities Act, RSO 1990, 





In addition to insiders, provincial securities statutes 
regulate the conduct of those in a “special relationship” with the 
reporting issuer. The relevant legal provision states that “No 
person or company in a special relationship with a reporting 
issuer shall purchase or sell securities of the reporting issuer with 
the knowledge of a material fact or material change with respect 
to the reporting issuer that has not been generally disclosed.”20 
The term “special relationship” includes but is not limited to 
insiders and covers a wide group of individuals such as: a person 
that is an insider, affiliate or associate of a person or company 
that is proposing to make a take-over bid of the issuer or enter 
into a business combination with the issuer; a person or company 
that has engaged in or is proposing to engage in any business or 
professional activity on behalf of the issuer; a person or company 
that learned of the non-public material information with respect 
to the issuer while they were in any of the foregoing positions; 
and a person that learns of the non-public material information 
from anyone else in a special relationship with the reporting 
issuer and knows or ought to reasonably have known that the 
other person was in such a special relationship.21  
 
The definition of “special relationship” is at the core of the 
prohibition on insider trading.22 Tipping, defined as informing 
any other person of a material fact or material change that is not 
generally disclosed other than in the necessary course of 
business, is also prohibited under the statute.23 With regards to 
both illegal insider trading and tipping, the definition of “special 
relationship” is of crucial importance as it means that the class of 
persons potentially liable for insider trading extends beyond 
                                                            
19 System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders, OSC NI 55-102 – 24 OSCB 
6325 and 26 OSCB 3163.  
20 OSA, supra note 15 at. § 76(1).  
21 Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s 9; Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418, s 3; 
Securities Act, CCSM c S50, s 112(1); Securities Act, SNB. 2004, c S-5.5, s 
147(1); Securities Act, RSNL 1990, c S-13, s 77(5); Securities Act, RSNS 1989, 
c 418, s 82(5); Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S.5, s 76(5); Securities Act, RSPEI. 
1988, c S-3.1, s 12(1); Securities Act, 1988, ss 1988-89, c S-42.2, s 85(1); 
Securities Act, SNWT 2008, c 10, s 12(1); Securities Act, S Nu 2008, c 12, s 
12(1); Securities Act, S Y 2007, c 16, s 12(1). 
22 Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s 207(1); Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 
418, ss 57.2, 136, 136.2; Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S.5, s 134(1); Securities 
Act, RSPEI. 1988, c S-3.1, ss 119(1), 155(1); Securities Act, RSQ, c V-1.1, ss 
187, 226; Securities Act, S Nu 2008, c 12, ss 119(1), 155(1); Securities Act, 
RSNS 1989, c 418, s 142(1). 
23 Ibid. § 76(2). 
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those who are defined as “insiders” in the statute.24 For example, 
since tippees are themselves considered to be in a special 
relationship with an issuer, material information used in a trade 
may be third or fourth hand and still be subject to the 
prohibition, demonstrating the wide scope of the “special 
relationship” definition.25 
 
The test for materiality is codified in statute. A material 
fact is defined as “a fact that would reasonably be expected to 
have a significant effect on the market price or value of the 
securities,”26 while a material change is defined as “a change in 
the business, operations or capital of the issuer that would 
reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market 
price or value of [any of the issuer’s securities].”27 This statutory 
test is objective and requires courts to view materiality from the 
perspective of the trading markets.28 More recently in Cornish v 
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), the OSC affirmed that the 
test for materiality is objective and stressed that the test is highly 
contextual and therefore void of any “bright line” rules.29 
 
For disclosure, courts have interpreted this requirement 
as requiring wide dissemination “in a manner calculated to 
effectively reach the marketplace” and in such a way so as to give 
“public investors [a] reasonable amount of time to analyze the 
information.”30 Unlike the materiality requirement, there have 
not been many recent cases clarifying what constitutes a 
reasonable time for the purposes of dissemination. A leading case 
remains Re Harold P. Conner, where the OSC developed a two-
pronged test for determining when information is generally 
disclosed: the information was generally disseminated to the 
public; and, the public was given sufficient time to consider the 
information given its nature and complexity.31 There is no firm 
                                                            
24 Ibid. § 76(5). 
25 Disclosure Standards, OSC, NP 51-201 (12 July 2002), online: 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-
Category5/pol_20020712_51-201.pdf> at s 3.2(2), (3). 
26 Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S.5, s 1(1) (“material fact”). 
27 Ibid., (“material change”). 
28 YBM Magnex International Inc., Re, [2003] 26 OSCB 5285 at para 91, 
2003 CarswellOnt 2632.  
29 Cornish v Ontario (Securities Commission) 2013 ONSC 1310 at para 51-
53, 227 ACWS (3d) 276. See also Rex Diamond Mining Corp v Ontario 
(Securities Commission), 2010 ONSC 3926, 191 ACWS (3d) 998; Donald, Re 
[2013], 2013 CarswellOnt 936, 26 OSCB 1449; Kapusta, Re [2011] ABASC 
322.  
30 NP 51-201, supra note 25 , s 3.5(2). 
31 In the Matter of Harold P Conner et al, [1976] OSCB 149 at 174.  
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rule as to when this will occur, since what is a reasonable time for 
investors to analyze the information depends on a number of 
factors such as the nature and complexity of the information, the 
nature of the market in which the securities are being traded, and 
the manner in which the information is released.32  
 
There are various defenses to insider trading. These 
include acting without using the information,33 no knowledge of 
the material information,34 disclosure of a material fact or 
material change in the necessary course of business before it has 
been generally disclosed,35 and reasonably believing that the 
undisclosed material fact or change had been generally disclosed 
prior to the impugned trade or that the other party to the 
transaction had knowledge of the undisclosed material 
information.36 In addition, insiders can enter into automatic 
securities disposition plans whereby the insider can delegate 
selling authority to a broker. As long as the plan eliminates the 
insider’s discretion over sales made pursuant to the plan, the 
                                                            
32 NP 51-201, supra note 25. 
33 Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s 147(5)(b); Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 
418, s 57.4(4); Securities Act, CQLR, c V-1.1, ss 187(2)-(3). 
34 Guidelines for Policies and Procedures Concerning Inside Information, 
OSC NP 33-601 (1998). 
35 Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s 147(4); Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418, 
s 57.2(3); Securities Act, CCSM c S 50, 112(3); Securities Act, SNB 2004, c S-
5.5, s 147(4); Securities Act, RSNL 1990, c S-13, s 77(2); Securities Act, RSNS 
1989, c 418, s 82(2); Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S 5, s 76(2); Securities Act, 
RSPEI 1988, c S-3.1, s 155(2); Securities Act, 1988, S S 1988-89, c S-42.2, s 
85(4). 
36 OSA, supra note 15 at § 76(4); Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418, s 57.4(1); 
Securities Act, RSQ, c V-1.1, s 187; Securities Act, 1988, S S 1988-89, c S-
42.2, s 85(6); Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s 147(6); Securities Act, S Y 
2007, c 16, s 156(1); Securities Act, S Nu. 2008, c 12, s 156(1); General 
Securities Rules, N S Reg 201/87, s 181(5). A claim of honest but 
unreasonable belief is not a sufficient defense. In Gorrie, Re, 2006 ABASC 
1087, at paras 5, 15-17, ASCD No 115, the Alberta Securities Commission 
accepted that the accused had a genuine belief that the information he 
obtained from a CEO had been generally disclosed at a recently held board 
meeting. Nevertheless, the commission held that the accused should have 
known the discussions were confidential and that he had a responsibility to 
confirm that this information had been generally disclosed before trading. 
Similarly, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Finkelstein v Ontario 
(Securities Commission), 2016 ONSC 7508 at para 116-117,274 ACWS (3d) 
656 recently affirmed that a number of objective contextual factors should be 
used to determine whether or not a person who receives material non-public 
information ought to have known that the source of the information was 
someone in a special relationship with the reporting issuer, regardless of 
their subjective belief. 
10 
 
insider will have a defense to allegations of insider trading.37 
 
In terms of penalties for insider trading, securities 
commission staff can choose to bring a quasi-criminal action 
which, if a conviction is obtained, could result in jail time of 
maximum five years less a day or a fine or both. In this case, the 
fine is equal to the greater of $5 million, or the amount equal to 
triple the amount of the profit made or the loss avoided by the 
person or company by reason of the contravention. Alternatively, 
securities commission staff can bring an administrative action 
where the maximum fine is one million dollars per offence.38 
Other sanctions can be layered on top of this penalty in the case 
of an individual, including bans from trading or from serving as 
a director or officer of a public company.39 
B. United States 
Unlike Canadian law, the offense of insider trading in the 
U.S. is based nominally on the prohibition against fraud found in 
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act,40 but it is closer to the 
truth to call it a species of common law.41 Beginning in the 1960s, 
the SEC pushed the courts to recognize insider trading as fraud.42 
The agency enjoyed considerable success with its agenda in the 
lower courts, most notably the Second Circuit, the leading 
intermediate court for securities law.43 The government got 
pushback, however, when the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
expanded the prohibition to include criminal enforcement, 
which brought the topic of insider trading to the attention of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. Beginning with Chiarella v 
United States,44 the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of 
                                                            
37 Automatic Securities Disposition Plans and Automatic Securities Purchase Plans, OSC 
Staff Notice 55-701. 
38 See, e.g., Section 122 OSA, supra note 35. 
39 See, e.g., Section 127 OSA, supra note 35. 
40 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 [Securities Exchange Act]. 
41 There is a “short swing” profits provision for trades by statutory insiders under § 16(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act, but it has limited reach. Although it is a strict liability provision, 
it only applies to purchases and sales (or sales and then purchases) made within six months 
of each other. As such, it is both under- and over-inclusive, and more to the point, readily 
avoided by timing transactions. Rule 10b-5, which is tied to the insider’s knowledge, is the 
more significant insider trading prohibition.  
42 The beginning of the SEC’s modern campaign against insider trading is 
usually traced to an administrative proceeding against a broker-dealer, 
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961).  
43 See, e.g., SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F 2d 833 (1968) (recognizing 
parity of information theory of insider trading under Rule 10b-5). 
44 445 US 222 (1980). 
11 
 
insider trading under Rule 10b-5. The law of insider trading as it 
stands now in the U.S. incorporates two principal theories:  
1) the classical theory, first recognized by the Supreme Court 
in Chiarella, which holds that a corporate insider (or 
temporary insider, such as a lawyer or an accountant) 
commits fraud when he trades with a shareholder without 
disclosing material, non-public information to that 
shareholder; and  
2) the misappropriation theory, which holds that a person 
who has received material, non-public information is subject 
to a duty of trust and confidence, and commits fraud when he 
trades on the basis of that information without disclosing his 
intention to trade to the source of the information.45 
A slightly broader prohibition applies to insider trading in 
connection with tender offers; under Rule 14e-3 of the Exchange 
Act, the government is not required to prove a breach of fiduciary 
duty in such cases.46 U.S. insider trading doctrine also includes a 
prohibition against tipping; tippees are barred from trading if 
they know or should know that they have received information 
from an insider who received a personal benefit from disclosing 
the information (such as cash, or an indirect benefit by making a 
gift of the information to a relative or friend).47 Tippers are 
jointly and severally liable with their tippees. 
The common law character of the U.S. insider trading 
prohibition leads to a variety of gray areas around the edges of 
the rule. The SEC has resisted a statutory codification, worrying 
that a statute would create a “road-map to fraud” if not written 
expansively enough.48 Congress has generally acquiesced in the 
SEC’s reluctance to reduce the insider trading prohibition to 
statute. Instead, the legislature has intervened only to correct 
particular problems with insider trading law, such as creating a 
private right of action for contemporaneous traders.49 This 
provision is seldom used; considerably more common are 
                                                            
45 United States v O’Hagan, 521 US 642 (1997). 
46 17 CFR § 240.14e-3. 
47 Salman v United States, 137 S Ct 420 (2016). 
48 A C Pritchard, “The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?”, online: (2005) 80:3 
Notre Dame L Rev 1086. 
<repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1508&context=articl
es>; Carmen Germaine, “Rakoff Urges Securities Bar to Write Insider 
Trading Law”, Law 360 (1 March 2017), online: 
<https://www.law360.com/articles/897188/rakoff-urges-securities-bar-to-
write-insider-trading-law>. 
49 Securities Exchange Act, supra note 40, § 20A. 
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securities fraud class actions in which insider trading by 
corporate executives is alleged as a motive for misstatements. 
Congress has also stepped in to correct obvious gaps in the 
insider trading prohibition developed by the SEC and the courts, 
such as trading in options.50 Most recently, Congress was shamed 
into adopting a prohibition against its own members and staff 
trading on non-public information.51 The SEC has been similarly 
circumspect in its rulemaking efforts; other than Rule 14e-3, 
noted above, the SEC has adopted rules only when necessary to 
clarify issues that had created serious enforcement problems for 
the agency.52 One of these rules, Rule 10b5-1, also creates a 
defense for transactions effected through a trading plan. 
The U.S. insider trading regime allows for a wide range of 
penalties, with monetary penalties most commonly imposed. The 
Exchange Act allows the SEC to sue the offender for a penalty of 
up to three times the profit gained or the loss avoided.53 This 
special penalty for insider trading is in addition to other 
sanctions available for fraud, including bars from serving as an 
officer or director of a public company,54 as an investment 
advisor,55 or as an affiliate of a broker-dealer.56 Criminal 
prosecution is also available.57 
Insider trading is an enforcement priority for the SEC, as 
well as for the DOJ on the criminal side.58 (Most criminal cases 
originate from a referral by the SEC to the DOJ.) The SEC is aided 
in its enforcement efforts by the surveillance efforts of the self-
regulatory organizations, most importantly, the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), the New York Stock 
Exchange (“NYSE”), and Nasdaq. Both the SEC and the DOJ 
publicize their insider trading efforts, scheduling press 
conferences to announce the bringing of charges, as well as press 
releases when the government obtains settlements or wins a 
                                                            
50 Ibid., 20(d) (prohibiting trading in options based on material, non-public 
information if trading in the underlying security would be a violation). 
51 Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act, Pub L No 112-
105, 126 Stat 291 (April 4, 2012). 
52 Securities Exchange Act, supra note 40, Rule 10b5-1 (defining trading “on 
the basis of” material, non-public information); 10b5-2 (defining duties of 
trust and confidence for purposes of the misappropriation theory). 
53 Securities Exchange Act, supra note 40, § 21A(a)(2). 
54 Ibid., § 21(d)(2). 
55 Investment Advisers Act § 203(f). 
56 Securities Exchange Act, supra note 40, § 15(b)(6). 
57 Ibid., § 32. 
58 See A C Pritchard, “Insider Trading and the Ambiguous Quest for Edge” 
(2018) 116:6 Mich L Rev 945. 
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verdict at trial. The SEC also features insider trading cases 
prominently when it reports annually to Congress.59 State 
securities regulators, by contrast, play only a peripheral role in 
enforcing prohibitions against insider trading.60 
C. Comparing the Two Jurisdictions 
In this section, we highlight some of the key differences 
between securities regulators in Canada and the U.S. The section 
starts with a discussion of prior comparative work on insider 
trading in the two jurisdictions. We then compare the public 
company landscape of both jurisdictions as it stands today. Next, 
we examine the number of insider trading matters brought by the 
SEC and Canadian regulators as a proportion of the regulators’ 
overall portfolio of enforcement actions. Lastly, we discuss the 
resources available to the Canadian regulators and the SEC, and 
conclude the section by comparing penalties imposed by 
Canadian regulators and the U.S. SEC.  
 A detailed empirical analysis of insider trading cases 
conducted by Utpal Bhattacharya highlights two important 
differences between U.S. and Canadian regulators with respect to 
penalties. First, he found that when scaled for the respective size 
of the different stock markets, U.S. authorities prosecute 20 
times more insider trading violations than their Canadian 
counterparts.61 Second, he shows that, in comparison to the OSC, 
the fines administered by the SEC in the U.S. are higher per 
insider trading case by a factor of 17. 62 More specifically, 
Bhattacharya’s analysis of the enforcement actions of the OSC for 
the 1997-2000 period, when scaled by the number of listed firms 
in the TSX and TSX Venture Exchange, shows that the total 
amount of fines imposed for insider trading cases was 
US$700,000.63 On a per case basis, this value amounts to 
                                                            
59 See, e.g., SEC, Agency Financial Report, Fiscal Year 2016, at 16-17, 155. 
60 One (minor) exception is the former New York Attorney General, who has 
made some effort to discourage trading on non-public information with the 
potential for market impact. See Press Release, “Att’y Gen. of N.Y. State, A.G. 
Schneiderman Secures Agreement By Thomson Reuters To Stop Offering 
Early Access To Market-Moving Information” (8 July 2013), online: 
<http://www.ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/ag-schneiderman-secures-
agreementthomson-reuters-stop-offering-early-accessmarket>. 
61 Utpal Bhattacharya, “Enforcement and its Impact on Cost of Equity and 
Liquidity of the Market (2006), Canada Steps Up: The Report of the Task 







US$70,300. In comparison, for the 1997-2000 period, the fines 
imposed by the SEC for insider trading cases amounted to 
US$411,890,000.64 On a per case basis, this value amounts to 
US$1,201,000 per case. 
Today, the composition of the Canadian capital market 
continues to differ from that of the U.S. in terms of size and 
number of the public companies. One important feature of the 
Canadian capital markets landscape is that it hosts a large 
number of public companies, yet its total market capitalization is 
not very large.65 In other words, there is a large number of very 
small companies. Moreover, in Canada, there is a relatively small 
number of very large issuers; when ranked by market 
capitalization, the largest 100 companies on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) make up 70% of all TSX-listed companies.66 In 
comparison, while there are 60 major stock exchanges 
throughout the world, the NYSE itself is bigger than the world's 
50 smallest major exchanges and represents about 27% of the 
total market for global equities.67 
Second, insider trading matters make up a higher 
proportion of the SEC’s portfolio of enforcement cases when 
compared to those of Canadian regulators. In Canada, in 2016, 
illegal insider trading matters made up 8.3% (12 of 144) of the 
enforcement proceedings that were commenced, and 6.5% (17 of 
262) of the enforcement files that were closed.68 In 2015, insider 
trading matters made up 5.2% (14 of 266) of the enforcement 
proceedings that were commenced, and 8% (28 of 350) of the 
enforcement files that were closed.69 In comparison, in 2016, in 
the U.S., cases involving trading on the basis of inside 
information made up 9% (78 of 868) of the cases filed by the 
SEC.70 In 2015, there were 87 parties charged with insider 
                                                            
64 Ibid. 
65 Puri, supra note 2.  
66 Ibid.  
67 Jeff Desjardins, “All of the World’s Stock Exchanges by Size”, (2016) 
online: <money.visualcapitalist.com/all-of-the-worlds-stock-exchanges-by-
size/>. 
68 See CSA, “CSA 2016 Enforcement Report” (2016) online: 
<www.csasanctions.ca/CSA_AnnualReport2016_English_Final.pdf>. 
69 Ibid.  
70 See SEC Press Release, “SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 




trading, making insider trading 10.8% of SEC’s overall portfolio 
of 807 enforcement actions for the year. 71  
 Although Canada’s provincial structure of market 
oversight makes it challenging to estimate the total budget for 
securities market oversight, previous studies highlight the 
differences between the Canadian and the U.S. regulatory 
systems in terms of their budgets and staffing levels. Several 
studies show that, when adjusted for deflators such as market 
size, population and GDP, the levels of Canadian securities 
regulatory staffing and budget are actually slightly more 
intensive in comparison to the U.S.72 For example, the 2014 
annual report by the Financial Services Authority of the United 
Kingdom (FSA Report) suggests that, once normalized for equity 
market size, the supervisory budget of the Canadian securities 
regulation is more intensive than that of the U.S.73 More 
specifically, while the FSA Report estimates Canadian securities 
regulation budget per billion dollars of market cap at 
US$220,515, the U.S. budget was estimated at US$83,943. 74 In 
a more recent study, Howell Jackson attempts to normalize the 
data by considering other factors, such as population and GDP. 
He finds that although the U.S. regulators, which include state 
regulators in addition to the SEC, have a regulatory budget and 
staffing that is 5 to 9 times larger than Canada, the U.S. market 
is also 10 times larger.75 In other words, although the U.S. 
securities regulators are spending more per staff member than 
their Canadian counterparts,76 they also have a market that is 
larger by a greater factor. As Jackson suggests, this implies that 
when normalized for population, GDP, or market capitalization, 
Canadian regulatory budgets and staffing are more intense than 
that of the U.S.77  
In addition, Canadian and U.S. regulatory budgets also 
differ with respect to the proportion of resources allocated to 
enforcement activities, with Canadian regulators spending a 
                                                            
71 See SEC Press Release, “SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2015” 
(22 October 2015) online: <https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
245.html>. 
72 See Howell E Jackson, “Regulatory Intensity in the Regulation of Capital 
Markets: A Preliminary Comparison of Canadian and U.S. Approaches” 
(2006), Canada Steps Up: The Report of the Task Force to Modernize 
Securities Legislation in Canada (Toronto, 2006), at 81. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid, at 97. 
76 Ibid, at 94. 
77 Ibid, at 97. 
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lower proportion of their regulatory budget on enforcement than 
the SEC. In 2016, the SEC had a total budget of US$1.9 billion, of 
which US$1.7 billion was allocated to facilitating its programs. 78 
Of the $1.7 billion of this budget, 35% (US$595 million) was 
allocated to programs led by the Enforcement Division.79 In 
comparison, Canadian regulators allocate a lower proportion of 
their budget to enforcement activities. Although the portion of 
the regulatory budget allocated to enforcement is not generally 
disclosed by provincial regulators, previous studies show that, in 
general, securities commissions spend between 10% to 20% of 
their total budgets on enforcement.80 A study conducted by 
Charles River Associates shows that, in 2002, the OSC allocated 
over CAD$9 million of its budget to enforcement activities, while 
Quebec, B.C., and Alberta spent $4.4, $3.5, and $3.1 million 
respectively.81  
In conclusion, Canada and the U.S. differ in terms of their 
capital market and regulatory landscape. First, insider trading 
matters make up a higher proportion of the SEC’s portfolio of 
enforcement cases when compared to those of Canadian 
regulators. Second, in comparison to the U.S. regulators, 
Canadian securities regulators have slightly more intensive 
staffing and budgets, but they allocate a smaller portion of their 
budget to enforcement activities. However, it is important not to 
draw the premature conclusion that these differences are a result 
of a different propensity for enforcing capital market rules in the 
two jurisdictions.82 As suggested by Puri, structural inefficiencies 
or unique regulatory priorities (i.e., prioritizing compliance over 
enforcement) and challenges could be the factors that result in 
differences in enforcement activity.83 In the next section, we 
introduce our eight hypotheses that focus on the differences in 
insider trading enforcement actions in Canada and the U.S. 
                                                            
78 See table in the SEC, “US SEC Summary of Performance and Financial 
Information FY2016 report” (2017) online: 
<https://www.sec.gov/files/2017-03/sec-summary-of-performance-and-
financial-info-fy2016.pdf>, at 15.  
79 Ibid at 15-16.  
80 See Poonam Puri, “Enforcement Effectiveness in the Canadian Capital 
Markets” (2005) Commissioned Reports and Studies. Paper 3, online: 
<http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002
&context=reports>. See also Charles River Associates, “Securities 
Enforcement in Canada: The Effect of Multiple Regulators, study prepared 
for the Wise Persons’ Committee” (December 2003).  
81 Ibid. 
82 Puri, supra note 2.  






One may assume that the SEC has greater resources, more 
economies of scale, and more expertise in bringing insider 
trading actions.84 More importantly, the greater trading volume 
of the U.S. capital markets suggests that the total incidence of 
insider trading will be significantly greater in the U.S. (greater 
trading volume makes it easier to conceal informed trades from 
other traders; it is difficult to conceal informed trading in small 
cap companies). These factors suggest that the SEC will bring 
more insider trading actions than its Canadian counterparts. It is 
possible that Canadian regulators will be able to bring relatively 
more insider trading actions to the extent the Canadian actions 
involve more straightforward fact patterns. This effect is unlikely 
to outweigh, however, the greater size of the U.S. capital markets. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The U.S. will have more insider trading 
actions than Canada, both in absolute numbers and as 
scaled by the market capitalization of publicly traded 
firms in both markets. 
 
The more cosmopolitan nature of the U.S. capital markets 
leads us to our next hypothesis. The number of cross-listed firms 
is substantially greater on U.S. exchanges than on Canadian 
                                                            
84 For reference, in 2015 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission spent 
$1.586 billion on enforcement activities while Ontario, British Columbia, 
Alberta, New Brunswick and Manitoba spent $98.870 million, $47.7 million, 
$38.495 million, $9.9 million, and $5.036 million, respectively, on 
enforcement activities. For a full examination of budget and personnel 
differences see: SEC, “FY 2017 Congressional Budget Justification; FY 2017 
Annual Performance Plan; FY 2015 Annual Performance Report” (9 
February 2016), online: <https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/budget-
reports/about-reports-secfy17congbudgjustshtml.html>; Ontario Securities 
Commission, Annual Report 2015, (8 June 2015), online: 
<www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Publications/Publications_rpt_2015_o
sc-annual-rpt_en.pdf>; British Columbia Securities Commission, 
2015/2016-2017/2018 (2016), online: 
<www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2016/sp/pdf/agency/bcsc.pdf>; Alberta 
Securities Commission, 2015 Annual Report (2015), online: 
<www.albertasecurities.com/Publications/2015_ASC-
Annual_Report_Web.pdf>; Financial and Consumer Services Commission, 
“2015-2016 Annual Report” (2016) online: 
<http://0104.nccdn.net/1_5/1c7/37a/1bc/Annual-Report-2015-2016.pdf>; 
Manitoba Securities Commission, “Pride, Protection, Purpose: Manitoba 




exchanges.85 Although insider trading enforcement may be 
primarily intended to promote market integrity, it arguably 
promotes corporate governance improvements as well. Those 
benefits might accrue primarily in the jurisdiction where the 
foreign company is headquartered. The SEC is more likely to 
score points with Congress for “renting” the U.S.’s reputation for 
quality corporate governance to foreign companies than 
Canada’s provinicial regulators are with their respective 
legislatures. Consequently, Canadian securities regulators are 
more likely to focus on insider trading actions involving insiders 
of Canadian companies that are not cross-listed. In addition, the 
SEC’s greater resources give it a greater ability to pursue insider 
trading actions involving foreign companies, which pose a 
greater challenge for regulators when collecting evidence.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The U.S. will bring more insider trading 
actions involving foreign public companies as a 
fraction of all insider trading actions.  
 
Our next hypothesis relates to case complexity. We 
postulate that Canadian regulators will tend to avoid actions 
involving multiple companies. Actions involving insider trading 
conspiracies, in which information about different companies is 
shared among the conspirators, frequently involve investment 
professionals trading in multiple firms. (Financial institutions 
afford more trading opportunities, but they also face stringent 
compliance regimes, which may require cooperation with others 
in an effort to avoid detection.) These cases are likely to be more 
complicated, and consequently, will take greater resources to 
establish the connections among the co-conspirators.  
 
An implicit assumption of this hypothesis is that the 
number of underlying insider trading violations involving 
multiple companies for Canada and the U.S. is similar once 
scaled by the size of the economy. Any differences in the 
                                                            
85 Currently, there are about 491 non-U.S. issuers on the NYSE and 108 non-
U.S. issuers on the NASDAQ. In comparison, there are 236 non-Canadian 
companies on the TSX and TSXV. Of those international companies, 121 
(51%) are American companies. For more see Toronto Stock Exchange, 
“Guide to Listing” (2017), online:<https://www.tsx.com/resource/en/181>; 
New York Stock Exchange, “International Listings: Documents and Reports” 
(30 June 2017) online: <https://www.nyse.com/get-
started/international/documents-reports> [NYSE]; NASDAQ, “NASDAQ – 





incidence of multiple company enforcement are therefore due to 
differences in how regulators in each country deal with multiple 
company insider trading violations. Although we cannot test this 
assumption explicitly, we do note that most conspiracies 
involving insider trading at multiple companies involve 
individuals associated with financial institutions. As a 
percentage of the total economy, Canada’s financial sector is 
comparable to that of the U.S.,86 consistent with the assumption 
of a roughly equivalent number of underlying insider trading 
violations involving multiple companies scaled by economy size. 
 
Hypothesis 3: U.S. actions will involve more actions 
involving multiple traded companies as a fraction of all 
insider trading actions. 
 
Continuing with the theme of case complexity, we predict 
that the number of defendants for each action will be greater in 
the U.S. than in Canada. Greater resources allow the SEC to 
prosecute more complicated networks and more readily track 
down all of the potential co-conspirators. In addition, targeting 
tippers or tippees will require unraveling more complicated fact 
patterns, as will pursuing top insiders at a public company, who 
may also have greater resources to defend against an 
enforcement action. As discussed above, Canada and the U.S. 
differ in their respective legal regimes governing tipper-tippees. 
On the one hand, the U.S. regime is primarily common law based, 
requiring a breach of fiduciary duty, leading to greater 
uncertainty of interpretation for regulators bringing tipper-
tippee actions. On the other hand, the legal requirements in 
Canada, where a “special relationship” and the transmission of a 
material fact or material change must be demonstrated for 
tipper-tippee liability, are challenging to prove and may require 
more expenditure to prosecute. As a result, differences in tipper 
or tippee enforcement actions between Canada and the U.S. 
could also be due to the varying costs of enforcement in the two 
countries. 
 
Hypothesis 4: U.S. actions will have more defendants. 
 
Hypothesis 5: U.S. actions will be more likely to include 
tippers or tippees and top insider defendants. 
 
                                                            
86 Jeff Desjardins, “A Tale of Two Banking Sectors: Canada vs U.S.” (16 May 




The SEC is familiar with criminal process, frequently 
cooperating with the DOJ in bringing securities fraud cases. In 
addition, the U.S. DOJ has a long-established track record 
prosecuting financial market crimes. In contrast, Canada has less 
experience pursuing insider trading in criminal proceedings. 
This inexperience may, in part, reflect the constitutional division 
of powers between the federal government and the provinces. In 
addition, Canadian investigation and prosecution of criminal 
actions is diffused among federal and provincial bodies, making 
parallel criminal actions more complicated.87 Thus, the outcome 
of criminal prosecution is likely to be more uncertain, while also 
requiring a high level of enforcement resources. Accordingly, we 
predict, given equally egregious facts, the SEC will be more likely 
to make a referral resulting in criminal enforcement than 
Canadian regulators.  
 
Hypothesis 6: U.S. actions will be more likely to 
generate a criminal referral. 
Our next hypothesis relates to predictability. 
Predictability may lead to a greater probability of settlement 
because both the government and the defendant will be better 
able to forecast the likely outcome from adjudication. On the one 
hand, the U.S.’s greater experience with insider trading actions 
and larger stock of precedents makes enforcement more 
predictable. On the other hand, Canadian law more clearly sets 
forth the elements of the offense in statutes, avoiding some of the 
uncertainty generated by the U.S.’s largely common law 
approach to insider trading.  
 
Predictability is not the entire story, however, when it 
comes to settlement rates. Resources also matter: the greater the 
resources available for the government, the less likely defendants 
will be to take their chances with adjudication. The SEC has more 
enforcement actions to manage than its Canadian counterparts, 
but its greater capacity allows it to bring more resources to bear 
                                                            
87 For more on the difficulties in pursuing criminal prosecutions for capital 
markets offenses in Canada, see Poonam Puri, “Enforcement Effectiveness in 
the Canadian Capital Markets” (2005) Commissioned Reports and Studies. 
Paper 3. online: 
<http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002
&context=reports>; and Poonam Puri, “A Model for Common Enforcement 
in Canada: The Canadian Capital Markets Enforcement Agency and the 
Canadian Securities Hearing Tribunal” (2008) Commissioned Reports and 





if defendants choose to resist. Given the uncertainty over which 
regime provides greater predictability, we postulate that the 
“resource effect” dominates and that the settlement rate will be 
greater in the U.S. 
Hypothesis 7: U.S. enforcement actions will be more 
likely to produce a settlement. 
 
Like hypothesis 7, our final hypothesis also relates to 
outcomes: what sanctions are imposed as a result of the insider 
trading enforcement action? Both countries make available a 
range of sanctions for those punished for insider trading, 
including disgorgement of unlawful gains (or losses avoided), 
prejudgment interest on those gains, monetary penalties, and 
bars. Bars may preclude an individual from serving as an officer 
or director of a public company, or may limit the ability of an 
individual to serve in the financial industry as a registered 
representative of a broker-dealer or investment adviser.  
 
We postulate that, consistent with Canada’s pursuit of 
more straightforward insider trading actions, insider trading 
actions will result in lower monetary sanctions because trading 
profits may not be as great if enforcement does not target 
complicated conspiracies. We posit that trading profits are 
higher for more complicated insider trading actions involving 
multiple companies and defendants. Because of the lower 
monetary sanctions available, Canada will rely more on bars to 
adjust behavior. In the event that a bar is imposed in both 
countries, however, the U.S. is more likely to make the bar 
permanent. This reflects the SEC’s greater resources, which it 
may be willing to commit to exclude the most egregious offenders 
from positions that would allow them to repeat their illegal 
behavior. By contrast, Canadian regulators may be more likely to 
use their administrative power as a first line of enforcement; if 
those bars prove ineffective, subsequent actions and the 
sanctions levied may be more draconian.  
 
Hypothesis 8A: The U.S. will impose greater penalties, 
especially disgorgement and monetary penalties. 
 
Hypothesis 8B: Canada will be more likely to impose 
temporary bars, while the U.S. will be more likely to 
impose a permanent bar.  
 




To collect our sample, we identified all insider trading 
enforcement actions brought by the securities commissions in 
Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Québec 
from 2005 to 2015. (Our research did not uncover any insider 
trading cases brought by the regulatory authorities in the other 
Canadian provincial and territorial jurisdictions.) Using 
enforcement releases issued by the SEC, we also collected insider 
trading actions brought by that agency for the same period. For 
each of the actions, we identified the defendant(s) and their 
relationship to the traded company(ies). We also coded a number 
of features of the actions, including the filing and resolution 
dates, the outcomes of the cases and any sanctions imposed, and 
whether there were criminal referrals leading to prosecution. 
(We did not treat the criminal cases as separate observations.) 
Table 1 below shows the number of actions brought in each 
country broken down by the year initiated. 
 
Table 1: Insider Trading Enforcement Actions in Canada and 
the U.S. 
Year CA US 
CA-US Percent of 
Combined Actions 
2005 4 39 9.3% 90.7% 
2006 7 41 14.6% 85.4% 
2007 4 38 9.5% 90.5% 
2008 6 38 13.6% 86.4% 
2009 13 38 25.5% 74.5% 
2010 11 35 23.9% 76.1% 
2011 10 46 17.9% 82.1% 
2012 3 55 5.2% 94.8% 
2013 6 41 12.8% 87.2% 
2014 2 51 3.8% 96.2% 
2015 7 32 17.9% 82.1% 
Total 73 454 13.9% 86.1% 
 
Unsurprisingly, the number of actions is much larger in 
the U.S., reflecting its larger economy and deeper capital 
markets. The overall ratio of U.S. actions to Canadian actions is 
6.2 to 1, consistent with Hypothesis 1.88 If we look at that number 
                                                            
88 Although the number of actions is lower in Canada than the United States, 
it is possible that the number of defendants per action may be higher in 
Canada. To address this possibility, we computed the aggregate number of 
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relative to the amount of trading, however, the intensity of 
enforcement in Canada looks considerably greater. According to 
the World Bank, the value of shares traded in Canada was $1,096 
billion U.S. in 2015, while in the U.S., the corresponding number 
was $41,398 billion U.S. for the same year.89 The ratio of trading 
in the U.S. relative to Canada is 37.8 to 1. Adjusting for trading 
volume, Canada would appear to have a considerably greater 
intensity of enforcement when compared to the U.S., 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 1.90  
 
Of note, consistent with the research of Anand and Green, 
we found that the number of Canadian actions spiked in the wake 
of the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, whereas the U.S. 
numbers stayed relatively steady.91 Of course, these ratios offer 
only a crude comparison because they omit the actual incidence 
of insider trading, a data point that is unavailable given the 
clandestine nature of the conduct. These raw numbers also do 
not control for the type of insider trading; it is possible that U.S. 
enforcement actions tackle more complicated insider trading 
conspiracies, which would require greater enforcement 
resources. Consistent with this conjecture, the number of 
enforcement actions in the U.S. appears to be greater in the 
second half of our sample period, when the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation began using wire taps to target insider trading 
among hedge funds. 
 
                                                            
defendants for all actions in Canada (127) and the United States (2,138). The 
ratio of the number of U.S. defendants to Canadian defendants is 16.8 to 1, 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
89 World Bank, “Indicators” (2018), online: 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRAD.CD>. 
90 We also compared the number of listed domestic companies (including 
foreign companies which are exclusively listed) as tracked by the World 
Bank for Canada and the United States in 2015. See World Bank, 
“Indicators” (2018), online: 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO>. The ratio of 
listed domestic companies in the United States (4,381 listed companies) to 
Canada (3,799 listed companies) is only 1.1. The large number of listed 
listed companies in Canada relative to the size of its economy reflects a high 
percentage of small market capitalization firms with relatively low trading 
volume. To the extent trading volume better approximates the 
opportunities for an insider to take advantage of their inside information, 
we think that the comparison of trading volume between the U.S. and 
Canada is a better metric for the relative sizes of the capital markets of the 
two countries than the number of listed companies. 
91 Anita Anand & Andrew Green, “Securities Settlements as an Example of  
Crisis-driven Regulation” (2018) 55 Int Rev L & Econ 41. 
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We also applied the Standard Industry Classification 
(SIC) one-digit industry code to the traded companies in the 
actions and grouped them into seven categories, as reported in 
Table 2. For the actions with multiple traded companies, we 
coded each traded company separately. Table 2 compares the 
frequency of insider trading actions in the seven industry 
groupings for the two countries. 
 
Table 2: SIC One-Digit Industry Classification for Traded 
Companies 
 








Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing (SIC 0) 
1 1.4% 1 0.1% 
Mining & Construction (SIC 1) 40 55.6% 22 2.7% 
Manufacturing (SIC 2 and 3) 11 15.3% 401 48.7% 
Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas 
and Sanitary service (SIC 4) 
2 2.8% 41 5.0% 
Wholesale & Retail Trade (SIC 
5) 
3 4.2% 93 11.3% 
Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate (SIC 6) 
12 16.7% 99 12.0% 
Services (SIC 7 and 8) 3 4.2% 167 20.3% 
Total 72 100.0% 824 100.0% 
Chi2(2) = 302.7; Prob. = 0.000. 
The striking number from the table is the large proportion 
of firms in the mining and construction industries on the 
Canadian side. This is unsurprising given that mining issuers 
dominate the Canadian stock exchanges, representing almost 
one half of the total issuers on the TSX Venture Exchange.92 The 
natural resources sector is also very important to the overall 
Canadian economy, and it may be that the nature of this cyclical 
business, with its potential for dramatic variances in underlying 
commodity prices and boom/bust results, creates an added 
incentive for insider trading. Additionally, regulatory discretion 
                                                            
92 Poonam Puri, “The Role of Local and Regional Interests in the Design of 
Optimal Securities Regulatory Structure for Canada” (2003), online: 
<http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/reports/118/>. See also TMX, 




may lead to a greater emphasis on insider trading cases in the 
natural resources sector.93 
 
B. Empirical Tests 
Hypothesis 2 postulates that the U.S. may be more 
inclined to use its enforcement resources to investigate trading 
in companies incorporated outside the U.S. For actions with a 
single traded company, we determined the country of 
incorporation for the traded company. For the actions with 
multiple traded companies, we coded the country of 
incorporation for each traded company separately. We report the 
country of incorporation for the Canadian and U.S. insider 
trading actions in our dataset in Table 3. 
 











of all US 
Actions 
Canada 57 93.4% 26 3.2% 
US 3 4.9% 737 91.8% 
Other 1 1.6% 40 5.0% 
Total 61 100.0% 803 100.0% 
Chi2(2) = 531.5; Prob. = 0.000. 
As reported in Table 3, Canadian securities regulators 
primarily concern themselves with insider trading in Canadian 
companies, while the SEC brings more insider trading 
enforcement actions against companies incorporated outside the 
                                                            
93 The largest number of firms in Table 2 is in the Manufacturing (SIC 2 and 
3) category. In the following table we report the breakdown for those three-
digit SIC categories within the Manufacturing category where there are more 
than ten firms from either the United States and Canada in the three-digit 
category. 
SIC CA US 
283 (Drugs) 2 127 
357 (Computer and Office Equipment) 2 39 
366 (Communications Equipment) 0 30 
367 (Electronic Components and Accessories) 1 54 
384 (Surgical, Medical, and Dental 






U.S. (and outside of Canada). This broader focus presumably 
reflects the greater incidence of cross-listing in the U.S.,94 
making it likely that the trading was done on a U.S. exchange, 
even if the company’s headquarters and operations are located 
elsewhere. 
 
We next examine the complexity of the cases investigated. 
Hypothesis 3 posits that the SEC, with its greater resources, will 
be more inclined to take on complicated insider trading rings. 
This may manifest itself in investigations involving multiple 
traded companies, as insider trading conspirators exchange 
information in various companies. Table 4 compares the 
likelihood that an insider trading enforcement action involves 
multiple companies.  
 
Table 4: Multiple Company Actions 
 CA US t-test 
Multiple Companies 21.9% 20.5% 0.257 
 + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
Inconsistent with Hypothesis 3, we do not find significant 
differences in the fraction of actions involving multiple traded 
companies between Canada and the U.S. Investigations involving 
multiple companies constitute 20.5% of the actions in the U.S. 
and 21.9% of the actions in Canada.  
 
                                                            
94 NYSE, supra note 85. The NYSE, America’s largest stock exchange by 
market capitalization, had 451 non-U.S. issuers in 2006, 422 in 2007, 412 in 
2008, 496 in 2009, 519 in 2010, 521 in 2011, 525 in 2012, 520 in 2013, 528 
in 2014, 515 in 2015, and 487 in 2016. Currently there are 491 non-U.S. 
issuers on the NYSE. In contrast, the TMX group (which operates the TSX 
and TSXV, by far the largest stock exchanges in Canada) has fluctuated 
between 205 non-Canadian issuers in 2006 to 236 international issuers 
today. For more see, TSX Group, Annual Reports 2006 through 2017. When 
combining the NYSE with other major American stock exchanges, such as 
the Nasdaq and AMEX, the gap between rates of cross-listing between the 
two jurisdictions grow even larger. Specifically, there are approximately 724 
foreign issuers on the three largest American stock exchanges. See Nasdaq, 
“Companies by Industry,” (1 August 2017), online: 
<www.nasdaq.com/screening/regions.aspx>. Across the entire U.S. there 
have been between 912 to 1145 foreign companies registered and reporting 
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission between 2006 and 2014 
(this number includes companies traded on the Over the Counter Market). 






Another aspect of complexity is the number of defendants 
involved in a particular investigation or case. This issue 
implicates not only the number of people who may have been 
trading on the information, but also potentially the sources of the 
information. The latter topic is not simply a matter of factual 
complexity, which may demand more investigative resources, 
but it is also a matter of the elements required under the tipping 
regime of the respective jurisdictions. The U.S. regime is quite 
complicated as a doctrinal matter, with the elements of tipping 
somewhat murky. The more clearly delineated statutes in 
Canada, however, pose a challenge for regulators because they 
are required to show that the tipper was in a “special 
relationship” with the issuer and that he or she passed on a 
material fact or material change.  
 
Panel A of Table 5 compares the mean number of 
defendants in insider trading actions. Panel B of Table 5 presents 
the results of a negative binomial regression, with the number of 
defendants in an action as the dependent variable. We include an 
indicator variable for U.S. actions as our variable of interest in 
this regression. We also include a control variable for the number 
of companies involved in the action, as a larger number of 
companies may correlate with a larger number of defendants. 
Thus, the U.S. variable captures the increment beyond that 
provided by the U.S. having a larger average number of 
companies in its actions. 
 
Table 5: Defendants 
Panel A: Average Number of Defendants  
 CA US t-test 
Defendants 1.45 2.31 -3.147** 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
 
Panel B: Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of the 












Pseudo r2 0.027 
Dependent variable of negative binomial regression is the number of 
defendants in an action. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * 
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, we see that U.S. 
investigations involve a significantly greater number of 
defendants. This finding is consistent with greater resources on 
the part of U.S. regulators. Pursuing chains of tipper-tippees may 
require greater resources to investigate, favoring U.S. regulators. 
Legal differences governing tipper-tippee liability between the 
two countries may also be determinative. 
 
To explore this possibility further, we code the type of 
defendants in the insider trading actions. We examine whether a 
tipper or tippee is included in the action. We also examine 
whether a top insider was named as a defendant. A top insider is 
defined as either a current or former member of the board of 
directors or executive officer (including the CEO, CFO, President, 
COO, General Counsel, Senior Vice President, Vice President, or 
Treasurer). Table 6 compares incidence of these two types of 
defendants for insider trading actions between the two countries.  
 
Table 6: Type of Defendant in Action 
 CA US t-test 
Tipper/Tippee 27.0% 57.4% -4.609** 
Top Insider 31.7% 32.7% -0.144 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 5, the SEC is more than twice 
as likely to pursue tippers or tippees, a difference significant at 
the 1% level.95 By contrast, we see no significant difference in the 
likelihood that a top insider will be pursued, inconsistent with 
Hypothesis 5. We cannot say whether the lower percentage of 
                                                            
95 It is possible that the tipper/tippee numbers for the U.S. were inflated from 
2010 onward due to increased insider trading enforcement against hedge 
funds during this time period. To address this possibility, we compared the 
incidence of tipper/tippee defendants in actions from 2005 to 2009 only. We 
found that the incidence of tipper/tippees in Canada (20.0%) remains below 
the incidence of tipper/tippees in U.S. actions (52.6%) for the 2005 to 2009 
time period and this difference is significant at the 1% confidence level. 
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tipping cases in Canada reflects greater compliance efforts or a 
different standard of proof or enforcement focus. We note, 
however, that in criminal and quasi-criminal matters, no 
successful tipping case in Canada has been upheld on appeal.96  
 
For the remainder of our tests, we focus on the specific 
defendants associated with insider trading actions. We examine 
the likelihood of a criminal case being pursued as part of the 
insider trading action for a particular defendant. To examine this 
question, we estimate a logistic regression with the dependent 
variable coded as 1 if there is a criminal action for a defendant 
based on the same set of facts as the civil insider trading action. 
The regression is estimated on defendant-action level data. Our 
independent variable of interest is the U.S., but we also include 
control variables: the log of 1 plus the amount of profits gained 
from the trading; indicator variables coded as 1 if a tipper or 
tippee or top insider were named as defendants, which may 
reflect culpability and/or enforcement priorities. We also include 
an indicator variable, Fin Inst, if any defendant included in the 
conspiracy is employed by a financial institution, such as a bank 
or broker-dealer, which may face a higher level of scrutiny. (We 
also include employees of accounting firms in this category, given 
the regulatory scrutiny faced by that profession.) We present the 
results in Table 7. 
 
                                                            
96 One of the most high-profile tipping cases in the recent past was the case 
of R v Rankin, 2005 CarswellOnt 4068 (OCJ); R v Rankin (2006), 42 CR 
(6th) 297 (ONSC); R v Rankin (2007), 216 CCC (3d) 481, 221 OAC 184 (Ont. 
CA) [Rankin]. In this case, Andrew Rankin, a managing director in the 
mergers and acquisitions department of RBC Dominions Securities, was 
charged with 20 counts of insider trading and tipping under ss.76(1) and (2) 
of the OSA. The evidence in the case was the testimony of the alleged tippee 
and circumstantial evidence that documented the timing of the tippee’s 
trades and his connection to Rankin. He was acquitted of the ten counts of 
insider trading, but convicted on the tipping charges and sentenced to six 
months in prison concurrent on each count. This case was significant 
because it was the first Canadian case to yield a conviction of tipping. 
However, when the case was overturned and leave to appeal denied, the case 
came to stand as another example of how difficult enforcing insider trading 
and tipping is. 
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Top Insider 0.751* 
(2.45) 





Pseudo r2 0.081 
Dependent variable is coded as 1 if there is criminal prosecution 
involving a defendant. Standard errors in parentheses. z-statistics in 
parenthesis. Errors are clustered by action. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01.  
We found that U.S. cases are significantly more likely to 
result in a criminal referral leading to prosecution, consistent 
with Hypothesis 6.97 The lower likelihood of criminal prosecution 
in Canada may reflect a lack of experience and precedential 
success in Canada with such cases (U.S. cases date to the 1970s), 
more demanding elements or burden of proof, a lower budget for 
enforcement, the diffuse regulatory structure, or a different 
cultural understanding of the types of behavior that should be 
proscribed by a criminal sanction.98 
                                                            
97 We cannot know if there was a criminal referral that the prosecutor 
declined; we only see prosecutions actually brought. 
98 The Hon. Peter de C Cory & Marilyn L Pilkington, “Critical Issues in 
Enforcement” (2008), Canada Steps Up: The Report of the Task Force to 
Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada (Toronto, 2006), at 171-172, 
191-197; Laura Nyantung Beny and Anita Anand, “Private Regulation of 
Insider Trading in the Shadow of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence from 
Canadian Firms”, online: (2013) 3:2 Harv Bus L Rev 227-229 
<repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1641&context=articl
es> [Cory and Pilkington]. See generally, for the differences in enforcement 
policies and priorities among the Canadian provincial commissions leading 
to suboptimal enforcement as compared to a common regulator, and for a 
comparison of enforcement activity and effectiveness in Canada and the 
U.S., Poonam Puri, “Enforcement Effectiveness in the Canadian Capital 





Our final set of comparisons looks at the outcomes of 
enforcement actions for defendants in an action. First, we look at 
the likelihood of settlement. All else equal, a more 
respected/feared regulator should be better able to induce 
defendants to settle an enforcement action. Conversely, 
defendants may be more willing to take their chances in 
adjudication if the enforcement agency is untested or has limited 
resources. We assess this question using a logit model with the 
dependent variable coded as 1 if a defendant settled an action and 
0 if a defendant contested an action. The regression is estimated 
on defendant-action-level data. We include the U.S. as our 
independent variable of interest, along with the control variables 
used in the regression presented in Table 7. We present the 
results in Table 8. 
 









Top Insider 0.035 
(0.10) 





Pseudo r2 0.057 
Dependent variable is coded as 1 if case is settled for a defendant and 
0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses. z-statistics in 
parenthesis. Errors are clustered by action. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01.  
We find that settlements are more likely in the U.S., with 
the coefficient on the U.S. indicator variable positive and highly 
significant. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 7, 
suggesting that the SEC has greater leverage in settlement 




We also examine the sanctions imposed in the 
enforcement actions. We look at four sanctions commonly 
imposed on defendants in insider trading actions: 1) 
disgorgement plus pre-judgment interest; 2) monetary penalties; 
3) industry bars, which preclude serving for a specified period of 
time as an officer or director of a public company or serving in 
the financial services industry; and 4) a permanent industry bar, 
typically reserved for the most serious offenses. The first two 
variables are linear amounts, which we use as the dependent 
variable in OLS regressions. We code each of the enforcement 
actions in our sample as 1 if a bar or permanent bar is imposed 
for a defendant.99 We use these indicator variables as dependent 
variables in our last two regressions. The U.S. indicator variable 
is again the independent variable of interest, and we include the 
same control variables that we used in Tables 7 & 8. The 
regression is estimated on defendant-action-level data. We 
present the results in Table 9. 
 









US 1.691+ 0.360 -1.971** 2.210** 
 (1.67) (1.45) (-3.75) (5.52) 
     
In(Profits) 0.866+ 0.230+ 0.0712** 0.0217 
 (1.90) (1.83) (2.73) (0.76) 
     
Tipper/Tippee -4.317 -1.106 0.934** 1.268** 
 (-1.37) (-1.50) (2.59) (3.44) 
     
Top Insider -0.176 -0.413 0.0796 0.589 
 (-0.06) (-0.70) (0.28) (1.58) 
     
Fin Inst 2.834+ 0.870+ 0.599* 0.372 
 (1.75) (1.93) (1.98) (1.08) 
     
Constant -7.421* -1.746+ 1.166* -2.640** 
 (-2.08) (-1.77) (2.46) (-5.03) 
N 1021 1022 478 320 
adj. R2 0.068 0.012   
pseudo R2   0.110 0.193 
                                                            
99 The number of observations is smaller for these regressions because under 
U.S. law not all defendants would be eligible for a bar.  
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Dependent variables are: 1) amount of disgorgement plus interest; 2) the 
amount of the monetary penalties; 3) 1 if there is an industry bar; 4) 
contingent upon an industry bar, coded as if there is a permanent bar. 1 & 2 
are OLS regressions and 3 & 4 are logits. t-statistics and z-statistics in 
parentheses. Errors are clustered by action. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
Looking at the regressions for disgorgement and penalties, we 
find that disgorgement amounts are marginally greater in the 
U.S., but there is no significant difference in penalty amounts 
between the two countries, inconsistent with Hypothesis 8A. 
This result is not surprising given the standards used for 
calculating these amounts, which are quite similar in the two 
countries.  
 
Turning to the regressions for industry bars, we see that 
Canada is more likely to apply a bar as a sanction, but if a bar is 
applied, the U.S. is more likely to make the bar permanent, 
consistent with Hypothesis 8B. Among the other independent 
variables, tippers or tippees are more likely than others to face an 
industry bar and when they do, it is more likely to be permanent. 
Similarly, those engaged in insider trading who are employed at 
a financial institution are more likely to face an industry bar.  
5. Conclusion 
Our primary contribution has been to collect and analyze 
original cross-border comparative data relating to insider 
trading enforcement. We find certain distinct differences 
between the two jurisdictions. To begin, U.S. investigations 
involve a significantly greater number of defendants and these 
defendants include a greater number of tippers and tippees 
relative to Canada. This finding is consistent with U.S. regulators 
having greater resources, but also with the historical inability of 
securities regulators in Canada to secure convictions against 
tippers.100  
 
In terms of geographical reach, Canadian securities 
regulators primarily concern themselves with prosecuting 
insider trading in Canadian companies, while the SEC is more 
willing to examine insider trading in companies incorporated 
elsewhere. This broader focus on the part of the SEC may reflect 
greater resources, but also a greater incidence of cross-listings in 
the U.S., making it likely that the insider trading occurred on a 
U.S. exchange, even if a company’s headquarters and operations 
are located elsewhere. 
                                                            




Regarding sanctions for insider trading, Canadian 
securities regulators are more likely to apply a bar as a sanction, 
such as banning individuals from participating in the capital 
markets. However, that bar is more likely to be temporary rather 
than permanent. The U.S. is also more likely to see settlement of 
insider trading cases. In Canada, our findings are consistent with 
Anand and Green.101 They show that settlements are less likely in 
insider trading, market manipulation, and fraud-related cases 
than in other cases such as improper trading or misuse of an 
exemption from the prospectus requirement. 
 
Do these results tell us anything about the effectiveness of 
the centralized securities regime relied on in the U.S. relative to 
the more diffuse regime in Canada? To the extent that a 
centralized regulator has greater resources, including financial 
wherewithal and expertise, these resources may allow enforcers 
to bring more complex and extensive insider trading cases, for 
example, as against company executives and their advisers as 
well as cross-listed foreign firms. But, availability of resources is 
only one of many factors that affect the incidence of insider 
trading prosecutions; some factors are (partially) exogenous to 
the regulator itself, such as the number of cross-listings in a 
country.  
Our findings do not demonstrate a need for systemic 
reform in either jurisdiction and they certainly do not suggest 
that centralized regulation necessarily provides more effective 
enforcement. However, they do provide insight into the differing 
points of regulatory emphasis in the two jurisdictions (such as 
foreign versus domestic companies and bars versus other types 
of sanctions). From a comparative perspective, our research thus 
allows regulators to begin to evaluate whether their enforcement 
approach is optimal on the basis of quantitative data. In the 
Canadian context, some have argued that there might be benefits 
to having one agency that houses both securities regulation and 
criminal enforcement. While our results do not definitively 
support the one agency position, we note that Puri,102 among 
                                                            
101 Anita Anand & Andrew Green, “Securities Enforcement as an Example of  
Crisis-driven Regulation” (2018) 55 Int Rev L & Econ 41. 
102 Poonam Puri, “A Model for Common Enforcement in Canada: The 
Canadian Capital Markets Enforcement Agency and the Canadian Securities 






others, has argued that while insider trading enforcement in 
Canada could be implemented under the current system with 13 
securities regulators and a passport, a common securities 
regulator would be more effective.  
 
Our research has some limitations, of course. To begin, we 
have a limited number of data points on the Canadian side 
although we endeavored to collect the entire population for our 
period of study. We also do not have access to investigations in 
Canada so we cannot know which cases the regulators initiated 
but did not pursue for want of evidence, etc. A similar limitation 
applies to the U.S. data, as insider trading investigations may not 
come to light if the traded company is not brought into the 
investigation. 
We also see a need for more extensive research comparing 
the Canadian and U.S. enforcement regimes. Insider trading 
reflects only a fraction of the enforcement cases brought in either 
jurisdiction. Moreover, it is an offense that typically focuses on 
individual defendants who have abused a position of trust. 
Fruitful comparisons could also be made of offenses more likely 
to be committed by institutions, such as accounting 
misstatements and bribery of foreign officials. We have begun to 
undertake empirical work in these areas, but there are other 
areas, such as narrative disclosures and continuing disclosure 
obligations that also invite further scrutiny from a comparative 
perspective.  
 
 
 
